MEDEVAC
15th MED\15th FSB
Mike Bodnar
307B N Main
Copperas Cove, TX 76522 1704
254-542-1961
e-mail: mbodnar27@juno.com
http://ascca.ecorp.net
I was informed that long time MEDEVAC and 7th Cav Medic Jim
HALL is reported K.I.A. due to an auto accident. GARRYOWEN!
Jim, R.I.P. And thanks always, SO THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE.
Dennis O'DONNELL <DENNISODNL@AOL.COM>from Denver, CO writes
in and says that he was assigned to 15th MED in April of '66
at An Khe. He says that the orderly room had the words in
bold letters over the door: "Through These Doors Passed the
Best Damn Medics in the World."
He also says that he would love to locate a SFC Charles D.
CLINTSMAN, whom he says, "Was one hell of a soldier and
medic. [He] Always cared more for his men than himself. Felt
it his duty to stay in Vietnam after his first year, as he
said, 'This is what I was 'trained' to do.' Best lifer I ever
met!!!"
Dan PORTER <DANIELF@BIGPLANET.COM>wrote in to say that he
served with HHC, 15th MED BN in 1969, Phouc Vinh and with CO
C in Quan Loi.
Jim BLACK <HEADHUNTERS9@HOTMAIL.COM>wrote again to say: "Hi
Mike, This is 'Blackie' again with a bit of info for you and
your column. I'm in touch with the American Legion Post in
Jeffersontown, KY (a suburb of Louisville) and they are
dedicating a Veterans Memorial Park 27 May 01. The park
features 2 AA guns, a tank, and a UH-1 H helicopter. There
seems to be something special about this helicopter (at least
to me) that might interest you and your readers. Though this
bird has received a new coat of paint, I was told that this
bird had a MEDEVAC emblem painted on both sliding doors and a
CAV patch painted on the vertical tail when the bird arrived
to be painted. I have been able to obtain this bird's serial
#, which is 68-16405. Since the repainting, this memorial
piece only sports a good sized CAV patch on its nose. Betty
and I will be going to the dedication and take some pics of
the bird-which I will forward to you for your column.
Well gotta get moving. Take Care, First Team, Blackie
P.S.- So far nothing is happening with what you mentioned in
your last article for me."
Ric HOOVER <RHOOVERJ@TAMPABAY.RR.COM>from Largo, FL, wrote
in to say that he served with C Co 15 Med BN, 3 Bde 1 Air
Cav from Jan '66-Jan '67.
Dick SAUNDERS <RLSAUNDERS66@JUNO.COM>from TX says that he
served with B Co 15th Med Bn from Jan 2, '68 until Dec
31, '68.
I got snail mail from Doug CAMPBELL who was a MEDEVAC crew
chief of aircraft #67-17624 from Oct '71 through Jan '72,
out of FSB Mace. Doug wrote in response to one of my columns,
probably when I mentioned that the 1st Cav put M-60s on
MEDEVAC in Jan '66 and that they stayed on, the only
aeromedical evacuation unit in Vietnam to have fixed
armament.
Doug says that at the start of '72 they did remove their 60s.
He refers to an article in the Jan '72 "Garryowen" about
supporting 2-5 Cav on Jan 03, '72. I infer that was a combat
mission, and not the "garrison duty" that they were told they
had then become, which is why he goes on to say that they
also had to paint their MEDEVACs white!
Doug says that MEDEVAC at his time was still pulling hoist
missions in triple canopy on the majority of the "contact"
missions. He says that once his first up aircraft out of Bien
Hoa was interviewed by both CBS and NBC news and asked how
they felt about having to remove their 60s, and painting
their MEDEVACs white.
He says that only speaking for the E.M., they did not much
care for losing their 60s but were outraged at having to
paint their aircrafts white! He says that the red crosses had
presented enough of a target and that all the new S.O.P.
would be further endangering the lives of the wounded and
crew.
Doug also said that for him, MEDEVAC was the best duty in-
country. He ended his letter by saying that the only downside
of his time there was that they were expected to be more
"stateside" due to their "stepping down," which would have
been the end of the 1st Cav' assignment in Vietnam.
I had read about why the red crosses were retained, and the
later painting of the helicopters white, in the out of print
G.P.O. book: ARMY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN VIETNAM by Peter
DORLAND and James NANNEY,
<HTTP: d
ustoff> in the section titled: "Enemy Fire," which I include
below:
"Although pilot error and mechanical failure accounted for
more aircraft and crew losses in Vietnam than enemy fire, the
air ambulance pilots worried more about the latter danger
than the other more controllable ones. Once the buildup got
under way in 1965, any air ambulance pilot who served a full,
one-year tour could expect to have his aircraft hit by the
enemy at least once. When hoist missions became a routine
part of air ambulance work in late 1966, enemy fire became
especially dangerous. Although the pilots devised ways of
reducing the danger, such efforts barely kept pace with
improvements in enemy weaponry and marksmanship.
"Before the buildup began the pilots had little more than
homemade weapons to fear. In 1962 and 1963 the 57th Air
Ambulance Detachment suffered less from enemy fire than the
nonmedical helicopter units, partly because of the limited
number of missions the unit flew in this period. The unit's
five ambulance helicopters flew a total of only 2,800 hours
those two years, and no pilot or crewman was wounded or
killed in action. To get their minimum flight time and
provide themselves some insurance against a lucky enemy hit,
the pilots started flying two ships on each mission. But once
the buildup got under way in late 1964 the unit went back to
single ship missions, and most of the division and
nondivisional air ambulance units that later joined them also
followed this practice.
"The return to single-ship missions demanded a few unorthodox
procedures. International custom and the Geneva Conventions,
which the United States considered itself bound to observe,
dictated that an ambulance not carry arms or ammunition and
not engage in combat. But in Vietnam the frequent enemy fire
at air ambulances marked with red crosses made this policy
unrealistic. Early in the war the crews started taking along
.45-caliber pistols, M14 rifles, and sometimes M79 grenade
launchers. The ground crews installed extra armor plating on
the backs and sides of the pilots' seats. The hoist missions,
introduced in the late fall of 1966, produced a high rate of
aircraft losses and crewmember casualties. Although at this
stage of the war gunship escorts for air ambulance missions
were still hard to arrange, only the Air Ambulance Platoon of
the 1st Cavalry responded to the new danger by putting
machine guns on their aircraft. At first the unit simply
suspended two M60's on straps from the roof over the cargo
doors. Later they installed fixed mechanical mountings for
the guns. A platoon aircraft also usually carried a gunner as
a fifth crewmember to handle one of the M60's. Later in the
war many of the air ambulance units, both divisional and
nondivisional, tried to arrange gunship escorts, especially
for hoist missions, to pickup zones that had been called in
as insecure. Throughout the war, however, such escorts proved
hard to obtain, because aeromedical evacuation was always a
secondary mission for a gunship in a combat zone.
"None of these defensive measures reduced the rate of air
ambulance losses in the war; they only prevented it from
approaching a prohibitive level. Most of the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese soldiers clearly considered the air
ambulances just another target. A Viet Cong document captured
in early 1964 describing U.S. helicopters read: "The type
used to transport commanders or casualties looks like a
ladle. Lead this type aircraft I times its length when in
flight. It is good to fire at the engine section when it is
hovering or landing." Fortunately Viet Cong weapons early in
the war made a helicopter kill virtually impossible. Late in
1964, however, the North Vietnamese began to supply the Viet
Cong with large amounts of sophisticated firearms: Chinese
Communist copies of the Soviet AK47 assault rifle, the SKS
semiautomatic carbine, and the RPD light machine gun. The
introduction of these new enemy weapons in 1965-66 and of the
hoist missions in late 1966 caused a dramatic increase in
1967 in the rate of enemy hits on air ambulances. Only in
April 1972, however, when the United States was well along in
turning the war over to the South Vietnamese, did the air
ambulance have to contend with the Soviet SA-7 heat-seeking
missile. This antiaircraft device was about five feet long,
weighed thirty-three pounds, and had a range of almost six
miles. A pilot had little warning of the missile's approach
other than a quick glimpse of its white vapor trail just
before it separated the tail boom from his aircraft. This
weapon downed several air ambulances in the last year of U.S.
participation in the war.
"The missile also disrupted the most elaborate effort the
Army made during the war to reduce the losses of air
ambulances: a change of their color. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions did not require that air ambulances be painted
white, and for their first nine years in Vietnam the Army's
air ambulances were the standard olive drab, medically marked
only by red crosses on small white background squares. Early
in the war many of the pilots thought that the crosses
improved the enemy's aim at their ships, and the unit
commanders had to resist pressure to remove the markings.
Arguing that they would be unable to keep aircraft that
looked like transports dedicated to a medical mission, the
commanders prevailed, and the red crosses remained for the
rest of the war.
"By mid-1971, however, the high loss rate for air ambulances
over the last six years produced much doubt about the olive
drab color scheme. Believing that making the aircraft more
distinctive might be the answer, the Army Medical Command in
Vietnam secured approval in August to paint some of its
aircraft white. The Command also was allowed to try to
persuade the enemy that the white helicopters were for
medical use only and should not be fired on. Thousands of
posters were to be distributed and millions of leaflets
dropped over enemy-held territory. The most elaborate leaflet
read:
'Some new medical helicopters not only have Red Cross
markings on all sides but they also are painted white instead
of green. This is to help you recognize them better than
before in order to give the wounded a better chance to get
fast medical help. Like all other medical helicopters, these
new white helicopters are not armed, do not carry ammunition,
and their only mission is to save endangered lives without
distinction as to civilians or soldiers, friend or foe.
'MEDICAL HELICOPTERS ARE USED FOR RESCUE MISSIONS AND THEY
ARE NOT ENGAGED IN COMBAT. YOU SHOULD NOT FIRE AT THEM.'
"An enemy soldier still intent on bringing down any U.S.
helicopter would now find the white helicopters excellent
targets against a background of forests, hills, or mountains.
All armaments now had to be removed from the ambulances, and
gunship escorts could no longer furnish close support. Unless
the information campaign were successful, the air ambulances
would encounter more rather than less resistance. But the
risk, while undeniable, seemed justifiable in view of combat
loss statistics: from January 1970 through April 1971 the air
ambulance combat loss rate was about 2.5 times as great as
that for all Army helicopters. Something had to be done.
"The test program for white helicopters, begun on 1 October
1971, soon produced encouraging preliminary results. In
November the Army medical command received permission to
paint all of its remaining fifty air ambulances white.
However, the drawdown of U.S. forces was now in full
swing. The test, which terminated the following April, had
begun too late in the conflict and with too few helicopters
to produce conclusive results. The white helicopters at least
had not proven any more dangerous than those painted olive
drab. On 28 April 1972 the MACV Surgeon recommended to the
Surgeon General that white helicopters continue to be used
for medical evacuation by the dwindling number of Army units
in Vietnam.
"But in the same month the enemy's introduction of the heat-
seeking SA7 missile to South Vietnam put Army medical
planners in a new quandary. To navigate properly, most air
ambulance pilots could not fly to and from a pickup zone at
altitudes low enough to enable the enemy on the ground to
discern the white color and the red crosses. Except at the
pickup zone, the white ambulances were as vulnerable as any
other Army olive drab aircraft. Between 1 July 1972 and 8
January 1973 the enemy fired eight heat-seeking missiles at
white air ambulances. The only protection against the SA7 was
a new paint that reflected little of the engine's infrared
radiation but dried to a dull charcoal green. In January 1973
USARV/MACV Support Command directed that all U.S. Army air
ambulances in Vietnam be painted with the new protective
paint. Research began on a white protective paint, but before
any significant progress could be made the war ended."
I never thought that I would hear from a MEDEVAC veteran of
the "last shift" like Doug CAMPBELL, but that shows who is
out there and paying attention, as well as interested enough
to reply. Unlike some, I will try to publish anything
pertinent that you send in to me, but like Doug, you have to
send it, which includes e-mailing it to me. If you have an
interest to publish your stories of your experiences, send
them to me, if you do not, they will never get read by those
1st Cav veterans who are interested.
Another veteran who has shown that interest along with his
long, notable Army career is James M. MCDONALD, MEDEVAC PSG
'70-'71, who wrote the following story: "When was the last
MEDEVAC Mission?"
"Although 26 March 1971 officially marked the end of duties
in Vietnam for the 1st Cavalry Division, President Nixon's
program of "Vietnamization" required the continued presence
of a strong U.S. fighting force. The 2nd Battalion of the 5th
Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, 2nd Battalion of
the 8th Regiment and 1st Battalion of the 12th Regiment along
with specialized support units as "F" Troop, 9th Cavalry and
Delta Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion helped
establish the 3rd Brigade headquarters at Bien Hoa. Its
primary mission was to interdict enemy infiltration and
supply routes in War Zone D.
"The 3rd Brigade was well equipped with helicopters from the
229th Assault Helicopter Battalion and later, a battery of
"BLUE MAX," aerial field units and two air cavalry troops. A
QRF (Quick Reaction Force) -known as "Blue Platoons," was
maintained in support of any air assault action. The "Blues"
traveled light, fought hard and had three primary missions;
1) to form a "field force" around any helicopter downed by
enemy fire or mechanical failure; 2) to give quick backup to
Ranger Patrols who made enemy contact; and 3) to search for
enemy trails, caches and bunker complexes.
"BLUE MAX," "F" Battery, 79th Aerial Rocket Artillery, was
another familiar aerial artillery unit. Greatly appreciated
by troopers of the 1st Cavalry, its heavily armed Cobras flew
a variety of fire missions in support of the operations of
the 3rd Brigade. The pilots of "BLUE MAX" were among the most
experienced combat fliers in the Vietnam War. Many had
volunteered for the extra duty to cover the extended stay of
the 1st Cavalry Division.
"On 30 March 1972, General GIAP of the North Vietnamese Army
began an offensive across the DMZ in a final attempt to unify
the North and South. By 03 April, these thrusts became a full
scale attack. More than 48,000 NVA and VC troops hit Loc
Ninh. Two days later, on 05 April, the North Vietnamese threw
heavy assults against An Loc and announced that by 20 April,
An Loc would be the new capital of the South for the North
Vietnamese.
"In April and May, stepped up bombings by B-52's helped blunt
the North Vietnamese invasion. Large groups of enemy soldiers
were caught in the open fields and entire NVA units were
destroyed. Helicopters and gunships from the 3rd Brigade saw
heavy action at An Loc and Loc Ninh, engaging heavy armor as
well as ground troops. The intensity of the fighting took a
heavy toll on them. For example, on 12 May, five Cobra Ships
were destroyed in less than 30 minutes by Chinese Surface-to-
Air (SA-7) Missiles.
"On 15 May, relief units, moving down Highway 13, broke
through and helped lift the bitter siege of An Loc. The North
Vietnamese were reeling from huge losses and began to
withdraw to their sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Their
spring offensive aimed at cutting South Vietnam in half and
capturing Saigon had been decisively smashed. The helo air
effort of the 3rd Brigade had turned in a magnificent
performance in support of the remaining advisors with the
ARVN units. During the period of 05 April through 15 May
1972, more than 100 T54 tanks, armored personnel carriers
and anti-aircraft guns were knocked out in the area around An
Loc.
"By 31 March 1972, only 96,000 U.S. troops were involved in
the Vietnam combat operations. In less than two months later,
the last of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 3rd Brigade, began
its "Stand Down" in a phased withdrawal and was bought back
to the United States, completing the division recall on 26
June 1972, which had started over a year earlier on 05 May
1971. The 1st Cavalry Division had been the first army
division to go to Vietnam and the last to leave. I want to
find out when was the "LAST MEDEVAC MISSION FLOWN IN RVN"?
Always remembering our 1st Cav troops on duty around the
world; over and out.
FIRST TEAM!
Garryowen,
Mike Bodnar C 2\7 Cav 1969
MEDEVAC 1-7\1970
SO THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE
